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Abstract:
The paper compares different aid policy instruments and their effect on the target group.
Starting from a situation where interest groups compete for the resources of the government,
international financial institutions aim to change the policy outcome. They can either directly
support one group or condition their financial help to the government on its policy. Apart
from a normative analysis which policy is more adequate to help one group, the paper also
asks what happens if the IFI is driven by bureaucratic self-interest, and whether this distort
policies.
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1. Introduction
There is now a wide spread consensus that just giving aid to governments in order to
promote development does usually not work (Boone 1996). Even the international financial
institutions (IFI), like the IMF, the World Bank, and the regional development banks
themselves conclude that aid is only effective in the appropriate political environment (World
Bank 1998, Burnside and Dollar 2000). Otherwise, corruption and self-interested government
ensure that most of the money that foreign donors allocate to development purposes will not
reach the target groups. Corrupt bureaucracies will divert money to themselves and
governments support only some groups. These groups will in most cases not be the “poor”
since these are not influential enough politically.
Therefore IFIs often tie their financial aid to some conditions, like a certain share of
spending going to certain projects or groups. This conditional budget aid is the alternative to
direct involvement of the IFIs where they support projects and NGOs that are considered to
help the poor, so-called project aid. The question is which of the two instruments is more
effective in reaching the goal to help the underprivileged.
I develop a simple model that compares project aid with budget aid to see which of the
two instruments allocates more resources to the poor. There are two groups in the recipient
country, the “rich” and the “poor”. The government leans toward one of the two groups, the
“rich” and allocates less resources to the “poor” than it would do in a politically undistorted
situation. Not surprisingly, unconditional aid given to governments cannot result in benefiting
the poor if the difference between the relative weight that the government puts on the well
being of the poor is much lower than that of the IFI.
The international community would thus aim to change the policy of the government.
Compared with a situation of unconditional aid to the government, where most of the2
resources would be flowing to the rich, the IFI can either stop the payments and allocate
project aid to the poor, or they can attach conditions to financial aid to the government.
Both policies, however, are not without caveats. Project aid will result in a readjustment
of government policy. Realizing that the poor receive direct support from the international
community, the government feels free to allocate more of its discretionary payments to the
rich. The poor will thus lose some in compensation for increased funds from the IFIs because
project aid crowds out other forms of support. In the end, the additional amount of money that
the poor receive is much lower than what the IFI spends on the project in direct aid.
Budget aid in turn is accompanied by a considerable increase in the amount of money
that the IFIs have to spend on development aid to the government. In order to force the
government to accept the IFI’s conditionality, aid has to increase. The result is that, again, the
government will use the additional resources to allocate part of them to the rich.
The sobering conclusion from the model is that both instruments can lead to an increase
in the resources of the poor, but that part of the additional resources will benefit the rich.
Only a closer alignment between the government’s preferences and those of the IFI can avoid
the conflict that money is being channeled to the rich.  Conditional budget aid or project aid
are thus no alternatives to government “ownership” of policies.
I also allow for a distortion of preferences of the IFIs. It has been argued that IFIs are
mainly interested to handle as many projects and as much money as possible, because this is
important for the internal career concerns of the desk officers (Vaubel 1991, Willett 2000,
Easterly 2002). Moreover, it is often the case that the IFIs themselves are under pressure from
donor governments to support politically important countries, or because some interest groups
in the donor countries push their governments into a particular direction (Fleck and Kilby
2004, Dreher and Jensen 2004).  Because of these additional influences, the policy choice of
the IFI can be distorted.3
The paper most closely related to this is a paper by Cordella and Dell’ Ariccia (2003).
These authors also compare project aid and budget aid in a theoretical model that allows for
differences between donor agency and recipient government. There as well, the size of the
relative weight being put on two conflicting objects matters for what is the better instrument,
and that the amount of resources available is comparison to the government’s funds is
important. In their paper, however, there is no discussion about own interests on the part of
the IFI.  They are completely benevolent there, thus missing an important factor in
international aid.
The paper also relates to the growing literature that acknowledges that domestic
governments are under the pressure of interest groups who lobby the government (Lahiri and
Raimondos-Moller 2000a, Drazen 2000, Boughton and Mourmouras 2002).  Using the model
developed by Grossman and Helpman (2001), Lahiri and Raimondos-Moller (2000b) show
that because of interest group pressure, fungibility is a major problem which explains why
funds are diverted, while Mayer and Mourmouras (2002) view the government as a common
agent of interest groups and a benevolent IFI that puts conditions on its aid in order to correct
domestic political distortions.  All these papers analyze the conflict of different interest
groups in recipient countries and how governments use the support they receive to help
mainly their constituents.
Moreover, I build on elements of the literature that analyze in detail the interest of aid
bureaucracies (Easterly 2002). Bureaucratic structures could imply that IFIs place more value
on handing out and administer major aid projects than on the effectiveness of aid, even if
countries continuously do not fulfill conditionalities (Easterly 2005). This builds on the
standard bureaucratic motive of maximizing the budget (Niskanen 1971, Moe 1997).  Closely
related are works that show that IFIs are not free in setting their policies but are under
pressure from donor governments. Dreher and Jensen (2004) show this for the IMF and Fleck4
and Kilby (2004) present similar evidence for the World Bank.  Hence, not only is bilateral
aid distorted (Alesina and Dollar 2000, Berthelemy 2004) but multilateral aid is distorted and
influenced by political aims as well (Nunnenkamp et al. 2004).
Finally, the paper is among the very few that looks at distortions on the side of the
donors and on the side of the recipient governments at the same time (Azam and Laffont
2003, Hefeker and Michaelowa 2003).
2. The Model
Consider the following utility function for the government in the recipient country
( ) 2 1 u 1 u W a - + a = (1)
where  i u  are the utilities of the two interest groups. For simplicity and without loss of
generality, I assume that one of the interest groups represents the “poor” (group 1) and the
other the “rich” (group 2). The government assigns the weights a and  a - 1  to the interests of
the two groups. If those weights adequately reflect the size of the two groups or if  2 / 1 = a
with equal sized groups, the government maximizes an utilitarian welfare function. I assume,
however, that the relative weights of the two groups follow political considerations.
There are several ways to interpret the relative weights a and  a - 1 . They could either
be determined through lobbying expenditures of the two groups, where the weights would
reflect the relative lobbying contributions of the two groups. Alternatively, the weights could
reflect the political power of the two groups in the sense of a political support function.
1  The
more votes a group can credibly commit to the government, the more the government will
take the group’s preferences into account when setting policy.
The utility of the two groups
                                                
1 For a survey of these models, see Drazen (2000).5
( )
2 *
i i i g g u - - = ,                                with 
*
i i g g < (2)
shows they are suffering if the amount of public resources they obtain deviates from a target
level of resources they wish to receive.   i g  is the amount of (net) public resources the two
groups receive from the government in the form of subsidies, income support or direct
payments.  These payments  i g  are realistically assumed to be lower than the amount of
resources the interest groups would like to receive 
*
i g .
The government’s budget constraint is given as






granted is aid if , 1 (3)
and A is the amount of official aid from the IFIs and g is the per period government revenue
spend on the two interest groups.
2
I assume that g is a fixed revenue that the government has at its disposal.  To sharpen
the results of the model, I also assume that  g g
*
i = , that is, every interest group would like to
receive the full discretionary funds from the government.
3  I assume that the two interest
groups do not take into account that there may be external financial support for the
government.  One reason why this is could be is that those payments are uncertain and not
predictable in size, because they are conditional and in the discretion of the IFI.
4
Another assumption I make pertains to the amount of money that the poor will actually
receive of the money that is allocated to them. It is well known that corruption and other
factors diminish the net-receipt of support to the poor. Government bureaucracies might
                                                
2 I abstract from other expenditures, which are constant from the point of view of this
model.  These would only be an additive constant and can be ignored.
3 This assumption is for convenience only.  All that is necessary to have a conflict
between the two groups would be  2 / g g
*
i > .6
distract part of the funds to their own accounts, or it may end up in Swiss bank accounts.
However, this problem is not unique to budget aid. Project aid as well might suffer from this
problem. Depending on the character of the agents with whom the IFIs implement projects,
this share of the money being distracted may be smaller than if allocated through the
government bureaucracy.
The share of resources distracted under budget aid is given as e, so that  ( ) e - 1 A
reaches the target groups. The share of project aid lost is denoted by  h, so that  ( ) h - 1 T ,
where T denotes the amount of project aid, reaches the destination. If the government is
relatively uncorrupt and has an efficient bureaucracy, one might assume  e > h  because the
use of external consultants is expensive.  In case of a corrupt government, we have of course
e < h .  In that case, it might seem promising not to rely on the services of the government and
its bureaucracy to administer increased funds.  However, the IFIs and (often also) the
governments cannot be sure about the actual amount of money being lost when they decide
about what policy to implement. I therefore assume that e and h are stochastic, with  [ ] 0 E = e
and  [ ]
2 2 E e s = e , as well as  [ ] 0 E = h  and  [ ]
2 2 E h s = h .
2.1. The Benchmark Case
Before seeing how the international community can try to influence the amount of
resources the poor receive, it is necessary to establish how the government would allocate
resources in the benchmark case.  I neglect diversion of funds for simplicity.
If the government follows its own interest when optimizing the relative shares of
government spending on the two interest groups, the relative shares that the two groups
receive are
                                                                                                                                                        
4 Nothing would qualitatively change if one would assume that  A g g
*
i d + = .7
( ) ( )( ) g g 1 g g 2 1 - a - = - a . (4)
Using the budget constraint of the government, the relative shares can be specified as
( ) A 1 g g1 d a - + a =
( ) A g 1 g2 ad + a - =
(5a)
(5b)
The amount of resources that go to the poor and rich respectively are corresponding to
the marginal utility that the groups have from obtaining these resources.  Since both marginal
utilities must be equal in equilibrium, g1’s share must correspond to that of the rich and vice
versa. Both groups receive their relative share a and  a - 1  of the government’s budget, and
the opposite share of any additional resources that the government receives.
2.2. The Interests of the IFI
Let the (for now) benevolent IFI’s objective function be given as
( ) 2 1 u 1 u V b - + b = (6)
where  a > b .  That is, the IFI cares more for the interests of the poor than the national
government does.  In the limit, one might assume  1 ﬁ b , while  0 ﬁ a  in the government’s
objective function. The difference  a - b  will be of crucial importance below.
The IFI is aware that the government will use any increase in resources to spend it on
the two interest groups in the same relation it spends its “normal” resources.  The more
distorted the government’s policy is, the more this distortion is increased through
unconditional aid to the government.  The question is thus, what effect would conditionality
have on budget aid and how could this result be possibly changed if the IFI would be using
project aid?
What the IFI would view as optimal amounts of money flowing to the two interest
groups differs from that what the government is prepared to give. Assigning a larger weight to
the poor results in8
( ) A 1 g g
IFI
1 d b - + b =
( ) A g 1 g
IFI
2 bd + b - =
(7a)
(7b)
as the preferred choice of the IFI.  1
IFI g g
1 >  if ( )( ) 0 A g > d - a - b  which is obviously fulfilled
if  a > b  because external support will certainly not be larger than the government’s budget,
thus  A g d > .
The IFI will hence look for ways to increase the spending share on the poor and it can
use two instruments to achieve this goal: by directly supporting projects or by conditioning
the aid it gives to governments.
2.3. Project Aid
This section derives how the IFI could directly help the poor by supporting projects and
how the government would react to this. The main finding is that the government will partly
negate the consequences of the direct help, because it will cut back on its own payments to the
poor.  An increase in project aid for the poor would prompt the government to reconsider its
policy towards the two groups, because the utility of the poor is exogenously increased,
making the poor better off while the rich are not affected directly.  The government will thus
reoptimize the amounts of money it gives to poor and rich. The amount of money allocated to
the two groups is then
( ) ( ) h - - a = 1 T g g PA
GOV
1
resulting in  ( ) ( ) ( ) h - + h - - a = 1 T 1 T g g PA 1 , or
( ) ( ) h - a - + a = 1 T 1 g g PA 1 (8a)
and
( ) ( ) h - a + a - = 1 T g 1 g PA
GOV
2 . (8b)9
This confirms the standard result that aid is fungible and that an increase in direct
support for one group will lead to a crowding out of government support for the poor (Lahiri
and Raimondos-Moller 2000b, Cordella and Dell’ Ariccia 2003).
5  The government
anticipates that the IFI supports the poor and will itself adjust its own contributions
accordingly.  From the point of view of the government this amounts to the same effect as if
the IFI had increased its unconditional support to the government.
6
The poor would benefit from project aid only if project aid is larger than what the IFI is
willing to give to the government alternatively. However, the IFI must also be aware that the
rich interest group would benefit from an increase in project aid to the same relative amount
that the poor benefit.
Moreover, because the absorption capacity of the poor in the form of relevant projects is
in general restricted, the usefulness of project aid is constrained by the absorption capacity of
the recipient country.  If there are not enough sensible projects, the maximum amount of
useful project aid is constrained.  Moreover, direct budget aid is much faster to disburse
because project aid is less flexible and needs more time for preparation.  In addition, the IFI
must be aware of the relevant losses of resources due to the fact that it needs to rely on NGOs
and external consultants to implement project aid. 
7
2.4. Conditional Aid
                                                
5 The strong result obtained here, of course, is due to complete fungibility, that is, the
government can redirect financial flows at its discretion.  If governments cannot completely
redirect those flows, the result would be less extreme than obtained here.
6 This is a result similar to those that show that an exogenous increase in resources,
either because of windfall profits or an increase in aid, would lead to more lobbying and thus
potentially increase distortions in the recipient country (Lane and Tornell 1996, Svensson
2000a).
7 Heller and Gupta (2002) show more generally that governments often have problems
with the absorption of large external help.10
Let us now assume that the IFI is willing to give budget aid, but only under the
condition that the government ensures that enough money is reaching the poor.  The IFI’s
condition for handing over money to the government will be some minimum amount of
money that is allocated to the poor.  How large would this amount from the point of view of
the IFI be and thus be made a condition? The optimal amount of resources going to the poor
would follow from optimizing the IFI’s objective function with respect to  1 g .  This, as (7) has
established, would be  ( ) A 1 g g
IFI
1 d b - + b = .  Comparing the desired share for the poor from




1 g g >  is
equivalent to  a > b .  From the point of view of the IFI it is thus always desirable to impose
conditionality on the government to ensure that g1 increases.
The IFI would thus require that the government allocate some share 
GOV
1 1 g g ˆ >  to the
poor in order to ensure that the poor receive a larger amount of the governments resources.
This conditionality, however, will not be costless to the IFI because the recipient government
can always reject conditionality and give up the financial support from the IFI. The
government will not (and maybe even cannot) simply change the structure of the financial
flows to the interest groups. Doing so would distort the political equilibrium in the receiving
country and could push the government out of office in the next elections or by a coup d’ etat.
To bring the government to allocate a certain share of resources to the poor requires that
the government’s participation constraint under conditional aid is fulfilled.  The government
must be indifferent between obtaining more aid from the IFI with conditionality and receiving
lower aid without conditionality.
At the same time, it is unrealistic in most cases to assume that the IFI could completely
set transfers to the government to zero, even if the government refuses to accept
conditionality.  Because of exogenous shocks or simply because of political pressure on the
IFI it might be forced to support the government to a certain extent regardless of government11
policy.  It is well established that governments continue to receive support, even if
implementing “bad” policies and reneging on promises to change policies (Svensson 2003,
Easterly 2001, 2005).









g ˆ g if A
g ˆ g if A
A
(9)
with  A A>  and  0 A ‡ .  If the IFI can credibly commit vis-a-vis the recipient country, it
might be able to set  0 A = .  The minimum amount with which that the IFI must support the
government can be arbitrarily small if the IFI is powerful and if the government in question is
not able to put pressure (directly or indirectly) on the IFI.
As argued, to meet the participation constraint of the government, the budget aid with
conditionality must compensate the government for the conditions attached to it. Take the
extreme case that the IFI wishes to force the government to allocate
( )A ˆ 1 g g ˆ1 b - + b = (10)
to the poor.  A ˆ  is the amount of money that the IFI then has to provide to the government in
order to make the government accept that  1 g ˆ  is flowing to the poor.  How large must A ˆ  be to
meet the participation constraint of the government?  To make the government indifferent
between the two regimes, the equality between  ( )
2
1 BA g g ˆ W - a = ( )( )
2
1 g g ˆ A g 1 - - + a - +
and  ( )
2 GOV
NC g g W
1 - a =   ( )( )
2 GOV g g A g 1
1 - - + a - + must be fulfilled, with  A A ˆ =  as the
critical value that ensures the government’s indifference.  This critical value, specified in the
appendix, is increasing in b and falling in  a.  It also rises in the mount of aid received
without conditionality A .
The participation also constraint ensures that the government would not renege on
promises that it has given to the IFI.  If the government can be made as well off when12
fulfilling conditionality as when not fulfilling, there is no reason for the government not to
fulfill its commitment.  Especially if the government adopts a longer-run perspective it
benefits from fulfilling its promise when adequately compensated by the IFI.
8  Another way
to avoid that governments renege on promises is ex-ante conditionality on aid.
3. The Influence of Different Policy Solutions on the Poor
Having established the instruments the IFI can use and how the government reacts, the
question is now how the poor would fare under either regime?
In the benchmark case without conditionality the poor will receive
( ) ( ) e - a - + a = 1 A 1 g g
GOV
1 , (11)
while under project aid their income is
( ) ( ) h - a - + a = 1 T 1 g g PA 1 , (12)
and under conditionality it is
( ) ( ) e - b - + b = 1 A ˆ 1 g g ˆ1 . (13)
Depending on the regime, the income of the poor varies greatly.  If we assume that
unconditional aid is rather low, or even close to zero, (11) will certainly be smaller than (12),
unless the amount of resources that “disappears” under project aid is much too large.  If the
difference between the amount of government expenditures given to the poor that the IFI
prefers and what the government itself wishes to commit to this aim  a - b  is large, it is
almost certain that (13) is the largest of the three expressions.
To illustrate, let  0 A ﬁ .  Then, the condition for 
GOV
1 PA 1 1 g g g ˆ > >  becomes
                                                
8 Another way to express this would be to assume that the government “owns” the pro-
poor policy when being compensated for this policy change.  On ownership, see Drazen and
Isard (2004) or Boughton and Mourmouras (2002).13
( ) ( ) ( ) e - b - + a - b 1 A ˆ 1 g ( ) ( ) h - a - > 1 T 1 (14)
and equivalent to a direct comparison between project aid and budget aid. The condition states
that it is obviously in the hands of the IFI whether the poor fare better under one or the other
system.  Budget aid is attractive for the income situation of the poor if conditionality results in
a larger share of government expenditures and if the net amount of aid received (i.e. net of
any losses due to corruption or otherwise) is higher. Thus, since  a > b  by definition, the
critical question is only if  ( ) e - 1 A ˆ  is sufficiently larger than  ( ) h - 1 T  to compensate for
a > b .  In other words, the direct impact of forcing the government to increase the spending
share on the poor must be larger than the crowding out effect arising from the fact that the
government lets the rich share in increased resources.
9
The condition makes clear that the income of the poor tends to be larger under budget
aid with strict conditionality, especially if g is large relative to T.  Also, budget aid tends to be
more effective if the losses under project aid h are high and it is less attractive if the losses
under budget aid e are high.
4. The Preferences of the IFI
4.1. Bureaucratic Interests
As indicated in the introduction, some authors claim international aid agencies
themselves have somewhat distorted preferences. Applying bureaucracy theory, Vaubel
(1991) or Easterly (2002) point out that the internal career structures make officers in those
agencies mainly interested in distributing as much money as possible, because promotion
depends to a large extent on the size and number of large projects that they handle.  Moreover,
                                                
9 Notice also that the total amount of government resources distributed g might
influence the comparison.  It is reasonable to assume that g is considerably larger than A or T
for most countries.14
it is not necessarily only the IFI’s self-interest that may create a spending bias in its policy.
Donor governments frequently request that some funds be allocated to some countries, quite
irrespective of whether governments have qualified for this aid or not. For whatever reason,
the IFI may put an extra value on being able to hand out financial support to the government
in question.
To consider this case, let the IFI’s objective function be given as
( ) ( ) ( ) T A u 1 u V 2 1 c + g + b - + b = , (15)
where  ( ) A g  is the gain if budget aid can be distributed, and  ( ) T c  is the respective gain of
distributing project aid.  I distinguish between the two forms of supporting countries because
the relative gain from distributing a special form of aid might differ.  The marginal gain for
the IFI of doing either is  0 A / > ¶ g ¶  or  0 T / > ¶ c ¶  respectively, where both are concave
functions.  Either for internal career reasons or because of pressure from donor governments
or the public at large, the IFI may develop a preference for using one instrument over the
other.  The question is whether and how the incentives of the IFI distort its policy choice
because its additional interest determines which of the two solutions is preferred.
First, however, I briefly establish when the IFI itself has an interest to engage with the
government in either conditional aid or giving aid to that country. It is, of course, conceivable
that the IFI, like the recipient government, has no interest at all to move beyond the standard
situation where the government receives only some minimum amount of aid A .  Since the IFI
has to decide about whether to use project aid or budget aid at all before uncertainties are
resolved, I use expected values for this comparison.  The condition for  [ ] [ ] NC PA V E V E >  is
( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] { } ( ) [ ]> c + - h - a - - a - b - + - h - a - + a b - T g 1 T 1 g g 1 g 1 T 1 g E
2 2
( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] { } ( ) [ ] A g 1 A 1 g g 1 g 1 A 1 g E
2 2 g + - e - a - - a - b - + - e - a - + a b -
(16)15
Using the assumptions  [ ] 0 E t = e ,  [ ]
2 2
t E e s = e  and  [ ] 0 E t = h  and  [ ]
2 2
t E h s = h , it can be
rewritten as
( )( )( ) ( ) ( ) [ ]> g - c + - a - b a - A T A T 1 g 2
( ) ( ) ( ) [ ]
2 2 2 2 2 1 A 1 T 1 e h s + - s + a - .
(17)
The condition states that, in the first term of the LHS, the IFI prefers project aid because
the poor receive more money under project aid if  A T >  and if the difference between  b and
a is large.  Moreover, if the uncertainty of money under traditional aid reaching the poor is
higher than that under project aid 
2 2
h e s > s , this also supports the use of project aid.  The self-
interest of the IFI to give as much money as possible is also supporting aid if project aid is
higher than unconditional aid  ( ) ( ) A T g > c .  The RHS of the condition compares the amount
of money received by the rich under the alternative arrangements.  It shows the problem of
crowding out normal financial help from the government to the poor, because the government
of the receiving country will cut back on support for the poor if the poor receive project aid.
Likewise, the condition for  [ ] [ ] NC BA V E V E >  is
( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] { } ( ) [ ]> c + - h - a - - a - b - + - h - a - + a b - T g 1 T 1 g g 1 g 1 T 1 g E
2 2
( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] { } ( ) [ ] A g 1 A 1 g g 1 g 1 A 1 g E
2 2 g + - e - a - - a - b - + - e - a - + a b -
(18)
which can be rewritten as
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )> g - g + a - b + s + a - e A A ˆ g 1 A 1
2 2 2 2
( ) ( ) ( )( )A 1 g 2 1 A ˆ 1
2 2 a - b a - + s + b - e .
(19)
The condition shows, again, that the IFI is better off under budget aid with
conditionality if the difference between  b and a is large because conditionality ensures that
the poor receive a higher share of government expenditures g.  Moreover, the self-interest of
the IFI makes budget aid attractive because the IFI can hand out more money than without16
conditionality.  If, which is unlikely to be the case,  b - 1  is large, however, the rich receive a
large share of the higher budget aid and therefore budget aid becomes less attractive (RHS of
the expression).
4.2. Project Aid or Budget Aid?
Supposing that the difference between the relative weight that the IFI puts on the
benefits of the poor and that of the government  a - b  is large, and that the self-interest of the
IFI to hand out money is non-negligible, it is clear that the IFI would prefer project aid and
conditional budget aid to giving aid without conditionality.  Moreover, the benchmark case
might not be a relevant alternative in any case, because IFIs are increasingly under pressure
from NGOs and other interested parties to ensure that poor people are reached by their official
money.  In as much as political reasons to give money even to the non-deserving governments
disappear, the relevant alternatives are project aid and budget aid with conditionality.
The question in this subsection thus is not whether conditional help should be given, but
what type of conditional aid should be given.  From the IFI’s point of view, budget aid is
more attractive if  [ ] [ ] PA BA V E V E > , which is
( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] { } ( ) [ ]> g + - e - b - - b - b - + - e - b - + b b - A ˆ g 1 A ˆ 1 g g 1 g 1 A ˆ 1 g E
2 2
( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] { } ( ) [ ] T g 1 T 1 g g 1 g 1 T 1 g E
2 2 c + - h - a - - a - b - + - h - a - + a b -
(20)
and becomes
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )> c - g + a - b + s + a - h T A ˆ g 1 T 1
2 2 2 2
( ) ( ) ( )( )T 1 g 2 1 A ˆ 1
2 2 a - b a - + s + b - e .
(21)
The IFI will prefer budget aid to project aid if this is a way to give more aid and if the
difference between the IFI’s weight for the poor and that of the government is large.  By
forcing the government to allocate the share b of g to the poor, conditional budget aid is17
beneficial for the poor.  Moreover, the larger the amount of crowding out going on under
project aid the better is budget aid and vice versa.
This positive analysis of the IFI’s interests need not align with those of the earlier
section that looked at how much money ends up in the hand of the poor. Career concerns or
fashions in the international aid community might distort policy (see Easterly 2001), and if
certain types of aid are preferred, the policy chosen by the IFI need not be the one which
leaves the poor better off.  If this is not the case, however, and if IFIs are really interested in
the well being of the poor, it is likely that budget aid will bring more aid to the poor and that
this policy instrument is indeed chosen by the IFI.
5. Conclusion
The present paper has looked at the question whether project aid or conditional budget
aid is better suited to increase the income of the poor. Starting from a situation where a
politically self-interested government benefits one interest group at the costs of the poor,
international donors have to ask themselves how they can improve the well being of the poor
in such countries. I have assumed that an IFI can either do so by directly supporting projects
that benefit the poor or by attaching conditions to aid to government, which ensure that the
poor receive a certain share of this aid.
The first result is that project aid, even if pushed by NGOs and other parties, does
usually not only lead to an increase of the income of the poor but will benefit the rich as well.
In the stylized model developed here, the government will take the project aid to the poor into
account and reoptimize the amount of money channeled to the rich.  Official aid thus crowds
out funds otherwise given to the poor.  By recognizing that part of the burden of supporting
the poor is assumed by the IFI, the government is generally free to spend more on the rich.18
A second result is that budget aid with conditionality might look as being a perfect
alternative.  It suffers from the same problem, however.  Moreover, conditional aid might turn
out to be a very expensive instrument to use. This is particularly the case where conditionality
is most needed.  The receiving government will only be willing to accept conditionality if it is
accompanied by a significant increase in aid.  This increase has to be larger the more distorted
the government’s preferences are in favor of the rich.  Receiving more aid in general, the
government will again use part of it to give it to the rich, thus the problem of crowding out
arises here as well.
This leaves a first sobering conclusion: International financial institutions do not have
much possibilities to force governments to spend more on the poor if governments do not
want to so.  If they put conditionality on the money they spend, this will only work if the
amount of money is sufficiently increased.  There is hence no simple substitute for
government “ownership” of desired policies.
Another aspect that is often overlooked in the literature is that IFIs themselves might
have distorted preferences.  If IFIs have an interest to spend money, either because they are
pressured to do so by the donor community or NGOs, or because of internal career
considerations, they will tend to choose those instruments that allow to distribute more aid.
This need not be the most efficient or effective instruments.  Aiming to spend more money
will push the IFI towards choosing budget aid as the preferred instrument because it will
imply more expenditures, if only to meet the participation constraint of the government.
Therefore, congruent spending interests might give rise to an implicit coalition between
government and IFI.
The present paper is only a first step toward an interesting and largely unexplored field.
Preferences of governments and IFI have been roughly sketched and are certainly missing
many of real world incentives and phenomena.  In addition, several simplifying assumptions19
have been made concerning the IFI’s capability to enforce conditionality.  Exploring the
relative effect of relaxing these assumptions would be a promising area for further research.
Another aspect would be to see if and how this simple model is supported by the data.
Appendix: Derivation of the critical level of aid to compensate the government for
conditionality
The government is indifferent between an increase in budget aid and accepting the IFI’s
conditionality and living without the support from the IFI, if
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The condition for this to be positive is that ( ) 1 ˆ 1 > b l +  or that  b l - > b ˆ 1 , which is the
case if  b is close to unity and/or if a is close to zero.  Thus, if the conflict between the
government and the IFI about the appropriate weight for the poor is large, the government
                                                
10 Note that the positive solution for  l  can be ruled out, because it makes no
economic sense.20
request a considerable increase in budget aid to take the poor as much into account as the IFI
wants.
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